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On The Warren Court and Judicial Review*
JESSE H. CHOPER**
I. Introduction
Consensus among its "constituents" has not been one of the identifiable prod-
ucts of the United States Supreme Court since the October Term 1953. If
there is any non-controversial statement that may be voiced about the Su-
preme Court under the stewardship of Chief Justice Earl Warren it is that
the Court has not been wanting in either critics or criticism.
It is not my intention to respond to the massive volume of uninformed,
unthinking, unbridled, largely undocumented, and generally unsound
carping and baiting that has been placed, mainly by irresponsible and legally
ignorant attackers, under the heading of "criticism." "Venom," I think,
would be a singularly more appropriate term for this commentary. As illus-
trations, one might point to the statement of the late Senator Harry Byrd of
Virginia branding the present Chief justice as one "who has done and is do-
ing more to destroy the form of government we have in this country than has
any Chief Justice in the history of the United States,"1 or the charge of the
then president of the National Association of District Attorneys that the Su-
preme Court is "destroying the nation." 2
Not only am I unwilling to dignify such intemperate tirades by responding
to them but, to you who are legally literate, I deem it wholly unnecessary to
do so. It is enough to say that such vindictive assaults have not been confined
* Delivered as the second annual summer University Lecture, Catholic University, July
26, 1967.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.S., Wilkes, 1957; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1960; D. Hu. L. (hon.), Wilkes, 1967. The author wishes to express
appreciation to Professors Yale Kamisar, Frank Goodman, and Philip Johnson for their
helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
1. 103 CONG. REc. 10675 (1957). See many of the columns by Mr. David Lawrence in the
U.S. News & World Rep., e.g., Mar. 7, 1958, at 108; Nov. 8, 1957, at 136; May 25, 1964, at 120.
2. Boston Globe, July 14, 1964, at 1, 26.
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to Chief Justice Earl Warren, to the present Supreme Court, or even to the
twentieth century. John Marshall was subjected to similar abuse, as was
Roger B. Taney. In May of 1861, the New York Times described the latter
Chief Justice as "too feeble to wield the sword against the Constitution, too
old and palsied and weak to march in the ranks of rebellion and fight against
the Union, he uses the powers of his office to serve the cause of traitors."3 And
the examples could be multiplied.
But it would be inaccurate to lump all of the critics of the Warren Court
with the late Senator Byrd or to characterize all of the criticism as wholly
irresponsible. Self-serving office seekers and hot-headed extremists have not
been the only groups dissatisfied with the work of the Court. Forceful chal-
lenge has also come from legal scholars and other students of constitutional
adjudication.
1I. The Voice of the Critics
In the vanguard of this latter group, Professor Philip B. Kurland recently
wrote that during the "fateful decade" between 1954 and 1964, "a period al-
most coincidental... with the presence on the Court of Mr. Chief Justice
Warren... the Justices have wrought more fundamental changes in the po-
litical and legal structure of the United States than during any similar span
of time since the Marshall Court had the unique opportunity to express itself
on a tabula rasa.'' 4 And, just a few months ago, Professor Kurland evidenced
no reluctance to extend his charge through the three years following 1964. 5
What of his assertion? First, it would be foolhardy to deny that the Warren
Court has rendered an impressive number of significant decisions-not just a
few breaking new ground or reversing doctrines thought to be inconsistent
with developing societal values and emerging human demands under a "liv-
ing" constitution, a document constructed to assure flexibility in the admin-
istration of government for centuries, as well as continuity.6 (It is well to re-
call that it is the Constitution, not the Internal Revenue Code, that the
Court is expounding. The insight of Chief Justice Marshall, "... that it is a
constitution we are expounding," 7 although not subject to easy, explicit or
concise explanation, was referred to by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as "the single
most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law-most im-
portant because most comprehensive and comprehending." 8) One need only
3. Quoted in 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 370 (1926).
4. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143-44 (1964).
5. See Kurland, The Supreme Court Today, 3 Trial, April-May 1967, at 12.
6. See Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 573, 579
(1958).
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 422 (1819).
8. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217, 219 (1955).
But see L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 65-66 (1958).
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mention such cases as Brown v. Board of Education,9 Baker v. Carra and
Reynolds v. Sims," Engel v. Vitale' 2 and School District v. Schempp,13 Mapp
v. Ohio14 and Miranda v. Arizona,15 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'6 and
Katzenbach v. Morgan17 to acknowledge the pace of the Warren Court.
III. The Vinson and Stone Courts
But what of the past? Are Supreme Court judgments that overrule precedents
no longer considered worthy and sound or that have highly sig-
nificant national impact a novel exercise of the Warren Court?
Examination of the work of the Stone Court and of the Vinson Court, of
the twelve years preceding the appointment of Chief Justice Warren, reveals
that a charge similar to that of Professor Kurland's might well have also been
propounded in 1953. Again, mention of only a handful of decisions indicates
that those Supreme Courts were not so far behind the Warren Court as some
would have us believe in such matters as innovation in the political and legal
arena and in reconsideration of precedent.
In Dennis v. United States, 8 described at the time as "by all odds the most
important and far-reaching of the recent civil rights cases,"' 9 the Vinson
Court clearly reformulated, if not eviscerated, 20 the Holmes-Brandeis "clear
and present danger" test2 ' which had seemed to have evolved as the govern-
ing rule for decision.2 2 In Korematsu v. United States,28 the Stone Court up-
held the Japanese exclusion order, a decision then characterized as "the
worst blow our liberties have sustaned in many years."2 4 In Shelley v.
Kraemer,25 the Vinson Court announced an enigmatic interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment's "state action" element, potentially imposing con-
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
13. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
18. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
19. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 222 (1952).
20. See id. at 217-23; Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present
Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475 (1951); Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-
and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1950). For general discussion, see W.
LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS--QUESTIONS
812-17 (2d ed. 1967).
21. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (dissenting opinion); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring opinion).
22. Dennis v. United States, supra note 18, at 507.
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 490 (1945).
25. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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stitutional review by the courts of virtually all commonplace transactions,2-"
and whose meaning and scope still baffles many of those who deal with the
case.27 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,28 the Stone
Court negated a 75-year precedent 29 when it held that insurance was com-
merce within the purview of congressional regulation. In Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education,30 the Vinson Court, then scorned as "eager
crusaders," 3' 1 for the first time, 80 years after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, held that the first amendment's "establishment clause" invali-
dated a state-sponsored program, in this case, released time for religious in-
struction, prompting Mr. Justice Jackson to charge that the Court had be-
come "a super board of education for every school district in the nation."3 2
In Smith v. Allwright,33 the Stone Court ruled that a primary election, held
not by the state but by a political party, was subject to the prohibitions of the
fifteenth amendment, overruling a decision3 4 not yet ten years old, and pro-
voking Mr. Justice Roberts to charge that the Court, having overruled three
cases that term, had become "the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in
the public mind as to the stability of our institutions." 35 And the examples
could be multiplied.
The point, of course, is not that the Warren Court has faithfully adhered
to the dictates of its predecessors, or that it has gingerly avoided moving into
areas of political and legal controversy; rather, it is that the charges brought
against the Warren Court for ignoring precedent, advancing novel doctrine,
and sponsoring broad redistributions of power in the federal system are not
unlike charges that could have been made-and have been made-against
every Supreme Court in the nation's history.
We have briefly examined the twelve-year period of the Stone and Vinson
Courts that immediately preceded the Warren Court's birth. Perhaps recita-
tion of the cases selected from that period falls short of persuading you that
the Warren Court is not a wholly different animal. Perhaps the pace of the
Warren Court has been more rapid, its impact wider. But I suspect that stu-
26. See commentary discussed in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 20, at
1309-14.
27. Ibid. See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (opinions of Douglas, J. and
Black, J.).
28. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
29. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
30. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
31. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3,
14 (1949).
32. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 30, at 237. Elsewhere, I have
argued for approval of McCollum, as well as the Regent's Prayer and Bible-Reading cases
cited supra notes 12, 13. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1963).
33. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
34. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
35. Smith v. Allwright, supra note 33, at 670.
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dents of human psychology, if not students of law, would tell us that the heat
of the moment colors our judgments and magnifies current events, and that
the passage of time produces a strong tendency to accept past momentous
events as being quite ordinary.
I further suspect that Supreme Court historians will not judge the twelve
years of the Stone and Vinson Courts as being especially eventful. But de-
spite this perspective of the mid-1960's on the tenure of those Courts, Pro-
fessor Alexander H. Pekelis could write in 1950:
The charges that one finds most clearly formulated in the present
offensive against the Court can be summarized as follows:
2. The Court systematically disregards its own precedents....
3. The Court fails to confine itself to the interpretation of the law as
it is. In the words of a New York Times editorial, "The majority
of the new appointees came to the Court... apparently under the
theory that their function was not so much to know and apply
the law as it stands, or in case of doubt to interpret it objectively,
but to apply a new 'social philosophy' in their decisions. The
inevitable effect of such an approach could only be to create un-
certainty regarding the law and turn the Supreme Court, in effect,
into a third legislative house."-8 6
Much the same is now being said of the Warren Court, but the attitude is
that the present Court is acting markedly different than any Court before
it. Yet Professor Pekelis wrote seventeen years ago of a different Court that
many now consider to rank low on the "activist" scale. I suspect that it will
be said again of future Courts. Surely it could be said with justice of past
Supreme Courts.
IV. The Distant Past
In 1803, the Marshall Court decided Marbury v. Madison,37 holding that the
Supreme Court has the power to declare an act of a coordinate branch of the
government unconstitutional. Thus, there was the establishment of the pow-
er of judicial review. It is surely fair to say that this most historic and mo-
mentous Supreme Court ruling was clearly not preordained. Professor
Alexander M. Bickel has impellingly demonstrated that the text of the Con-
stitution provides no explicit or even firm support for Chief Justice
Marshall's assumption of authority for the judiciary, at least in respect to
invalidating acts of Congress and the President.38 And it is by no means
36. A. PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 195 (1950).
37. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
38. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 3-14 (1962). But see Wechsler, Foreword:
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1959).
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generally agreed that the Framers intended to vest the Supreme Court with
such an extensive and final command.39
The critics of the Warren Court charge it with "the enhancement of judi-
cial dominion at the expense of the power of other branches of government,
national as well as state." 40 If this be accurate, it may be confidently said that
no Supreme Court opinion in history better fulfills that characterization than
does Marbury v. Madison.4'
But Marbury, a decision to which we shall return, does not stand as the
sole or even necessarily the most poignant example of the great Supreme
Court judgments in history that would fall under the analysis of those who
criticize the Warren Court.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall
have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States .... The desperate need of the national legislature for this
dominion was evidenced by the fact that matters of finance, commerce and
business motivated the call of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
in 1787.42 Under the Articles of Confederation, the infant nation was beset
39. Compare L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 28 (1958); M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL
184 (1946) with H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14-18
(1953); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195-96,
198-99 (1952). See generally L. POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 75-84,
91-96, 156-58 (1966).
40. Kurland, supra note 4, at 144.
41. Supra note 37. Professor Kurland, and others, also find as an "element that courses
through the opinions of the [Warren] Court . . .the absence of workmanlike product, the
absence of right quality." Kurland, supra note 4, at 144-45. We are told of "opinions that do
not opine." Again, if this be accurate, it may confidently be said, as Professor Norman
Redlich has ably shown, that no Supreme Court opinion in history better fulfills that char-
acterization than Marbury v. Madison. Redlich, The Supreme Court-1833 Term-Fore-
word: The Constitution--"A Rule for the Government of Courts, as Well as of the Legisla-
ture," 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1965).
Nor, on this count, does Marbury stand alone. As Professor Charles Alan Wright has re-
cently asked:
What Court in the past achieved a higher level of professional craftsmanship than the
present Court? The great opinions of Chief Justice Marshall surely fail the test.
Marshall discusses issues not properly before him, he flirts with provocative ideas and
then puts them to one side, he resorts to esoteric statutory construction to avoid deciding
constitutional questions, and he announces important conclusions without any reason-
ing to support them. Has any later Court done better?
Wright, The Supreme Court Today, 3 TRIAL, April-May 1967, at 10-11.
Many of the turgid opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes can be similarly criticized, e.g., the
landmark Holmes and Brandeis opinions articulating the "clear and present danger" test,
see cases cited supra note 20; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting opinion), which leave the most difficult and provoca-
tive questions unanswered. And the examples could be multiplied. See, e.g., the opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), whose implications are ex-
plored in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 20, at 1208-10. See also Wright,
id. at 11, regarding Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
42. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 310 (1916); C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More
States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1934).
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with severe economic problems. Protectionist-minded states established dis-
criminatory and burdensome artificial trade barriers against their sister states
as well as against foreign nations. 43 Other countries preyed on the newly es-
tablished industries in the states by refusing to deal with them on reasonable
terms. 44 The individual states were incompetent to cope with these problems
of commerce, 45 and, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was
equally powerless.
Thus, in brief, the great purpose of the commerce clause was to enable
Congress to facilitate interstate trade, to promote development of national
industries and markets and, generally, to encourage economic growth. Yet,
in Champion v. Ames, 46 the famous Lottery Case, the Fuller Court (although
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, joined by three of his brethren, dissented) held that
the commerce clause authorized Congress to prohibit the transportation in
interstate commerce of articles intrinsically harmless-a decision whose prin-
ciple has lead "to the conclusion that Congress may arbitrarily exclude from
commerce among the states any article, commodity, or thing, of whatever
kind or nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may choose, no mat-
ter with what motive .... 47 Thus, despite the purposes of the commerce
clause, the Fuller Court upheld Congressional power to hinder interstate
trade and, effectively, to destroy those national industries and markets that
it wished.
We are told that a major theme of the Warren Court "has been the effec-
tive subordination, if not destruction, of the federal system." 48 If this be ac-
curate, I suggest that much of the job had been done at least a half century
before. And it was nearly 100 years before the Lottery Case that Thomas
Jefferson said of the Marshall Court that it was "the subtle corps of sappers
and miners constantly working underground to undermine the foundations
of our confederated fabric. ' 49
You will recall that the commerce clause concerns a grant of power to Con-
gress. It is found in article I of the Constitution, which deals with the Legis-
lative power. The commerce clause makes no mention, directly or indirectly,
of the Judiciary, whose constitutional power is described in article III. Yet
in 1851, the Taney Court, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,50 found that, in the
absence of relevant federal legislation, the federal judiciary itself has the
power to strike down state regulations of interstate commerce. Yet, it is the
Warren Court that is charged today by some of its lettered observers with
43. A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 42, at 310-12.
44. C. SWISHER, supra note 42, at 25.
45. Stem, supra note 42, at 1337-41.
46. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
47. Id. at 362. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
48. Kurland, supra note 4, at 144.
49. 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 297 (1904).
50. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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enhancing "judicial dominion at the expense of the power of other branches
of government, national as well as state," 51 and with "the effective subordina-
tion, if not destruction, of the federal system." 52 The implication is that this
could never be said before. But it was of the Taney Court that the New York
Tribune asserted, "Of all the tyrannies that afflict mankind, that of the Ju-
diciary is the most insidious, the most intolerable, the most dangerous."5 3
In evaluating charges made against the Warren Court from the perspective
of Supreme Court rulings many decades earlier, I have not referred to deci-
sions that have, for one reason or another, fallen into disrepute-decisions
such as Lochner v. New York, 54 Dred Scott v. Sandford,55 Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.,56 or the broad federal immunity doctrine in McCulloch v.
Maryland.57 This would be too easy. Rather, we have seen that some of the
grand landmarks in the judicial history of the United States, decisions that
have preserved and enriched the Union, easily and perhaps more accurately
lend themselves to the very indictments brought against the work of the
Warren Court. Today, we accept and applaud these great decisions of the
past. I suggest that in not too many years, the momentous decisions of the
Warren Court, highly controversial and roundly criticized when rendered,
will similarly be accepted and applauded. The fact of the matter is that this
is already true of many, such as Brown v. Board of Education58 and Gideon v.
Wainwright,59 and is increasingly becoming true of a number of others, such
as the Reapportionment Cases60 and the School Prayer Cases.61 The passage
of time and appreciation of the resulting operation of the decisions seem to
soothe the fears of the critics.62
51. Kurland, supra note 4, at 144.
52. Ibid.
53. C. WARREN, supra note 3.
54. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
55. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
56. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
57. Supra note 7.
58. Supra note 9.
59. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60. Supra notes 10, 11.
61. Supra notes 12, 13.
62. As Dean Erwin Griswold expressed it recently:
We take pride in the administration of justice in this country and rightly so. But it has
not always been on the level that it has reached now, and we should hardly be surprised
if the present level is not the final one. In each instance, as the level has been raised,
those who were currently administering justice have been troubled. It is not easy to
accept new things, especially when the impetus comes from elsewhere.... Throughout
history the judges who have been known as great judges have been innovators ...
Often, there was much grumbling at the time; but in the perspective of history it be-
comes clear that they have helped to bring our law up to new levels. These are levels of
which we soon become proud once we become accustomed to them, and the newness of
the new standard wears off.
Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1018 (1965).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), bears a substantial brunt of most recent criti-
cism, the charge generally being that its obligation on the police to inform the accused,
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V. The Theme of Equality
To this point, we have examined two of the "three dominant movements"6 3
that Professor Kurland critically finds characteristic of the Warren Court-
"the enhancement of judicial dominion" 64 and "the effective subordina-
tion ... of the federal system. " 65 But it is the other "theme"-"the rise of egal-
itarianism"-that he tells us "contains the most novelty."'66 Here he appears
during custodial interrogation, of his right to silence and to counsel will severely damage
law enforcement; that the rule will "markedly decrease the number of confessions," 384
U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and "measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law
to perform," 384 U.S. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
It is noteworthy that, in the decision's first year of operation, at least some of the nation's
most prominent law enforcement officers have not found this to be true at all. See the state-
ments of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1967, at 54, col. 3; and District
Attorney of Los Angeles County Evelle Younger, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1966). But, apart
from this, perhaps it is true that Miranda will, at least in the short run, result in a reduced
number of confessions and an increased number of failures to convict. If so, this will be due,
in many cases, to the fact, as stated by one public official, that too many law enforcement
officers "really know very little about scientific criminal investigation-I doubt that some
can even take fingerprints properly-but they often become tremendously effective inter-
rogators." Quoted in Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 52 (1963). Or to the fact, as
stated by a former prosecutor, that "the weakest part of police work is their insufficient use
of surveillance and interviewing before they 'pop the arrest.' " Id. at 48 n.202. Compare the
record in areas where improvements in the quality, training, and facilities of law enforce-
ment officers have been undertaken. See the statement of then U.S. Attorney for the District
of Columbia, Oliver Gasch, in the Washington Post, March 26, 1960, § D, at 1.
Perhaps as suggested by Judge Henry J. Friendly, we do not "truly know that, as asserted
in Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted), 'a system of criminal law enforcement
which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation,'" Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 955 n.138 (1965). But I think that we may be confident that
the Warren Court's Miranda decision will, in the not distant future, be commended as a
material motivator of greatly improved law enforcement techniques throughout the
country, as has, for example, the Hughes Court's decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936), outlawing the "third-degree"--a decision, concededly involving police conduct
of a vastly different nature, that also decreased the number of confessions and convictions.
If law enforcement's failure forcefully to advance its detection proficiency were to deter
the Court from recognizing and enforcing vital constitutional protections of those accused
of crime, this would truly be "treating the sore by encouraging the infection." Rothblatt
& Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27
BROOKLYN L. REv. 24, 68 (1960). And, although pragmatic considerations certainly must
play a role in all constitutional adjudication, surely it is too late in the day to argue that
highly important rights must be submerged because their vindication will result in some
crimes not being solved. See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 171-72 (Sowle ed. 1962); cf. Schwartz, On
Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1954). Miranda has
yet to be accorded the benefits of time. I feel not overly optimistic in believing that its
greatest impact will be not so much in protection of the accused, but in protection of the
public through invigorated law enforcement and crime prevention long overdue.
63. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144 (1964).
64. See text at notes 40 and 51 supra.
65. See text at notes 48 and 52 supra.
66. Kurland, supra note 63, at 144.
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to be most disapproving, writing that the present Court has "sponsored [an]
egalitarian revolution in judicial doctrine," 67 while pointing to Mr. Justice
Holmes' dictum of 40 years ago "that the equal protection clause was 'the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.' "68 He describes "a good deal of
the product of the Warren Court in its search for equality" as "a work of
'jejune logomachy.' "69
Again, the basic charge need not be seriously disputed. More moderate70
commentators have recognized the "heightened concern for equality before
the law" 71 of the Warren Court.
Contrary to the plaint of the hostile critics, I suggest that the Court's re-
cent turn to egalitarianism is a salutary movement, quite properly fulfilling
its role in a democratic society. For, as those who have carefully examined
the complexities of our form of government observe, equality is an essential
part of democracy;72 "our type of civilization depends on 'equal justice un-
der law.' "73 Indeed, "the premise of democracy is egalitarian."7 4
Before turning more generally to a discussion of the role of the Supreme
Court in a democratic society, some examination of the Warren Court's em-
ployment of the equal protection clause is warranted. Little need now be
said in defense of the Warren Court's first great effort in this connection-its
condemnation of all state-imposed racial segregation,7 5 thus overturning the
Fuller Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.7 6 It should suffice to note that
the earliest decisions interpreting the equal protection clause, those of the
Chase and Waite Courts, 77 as well as the overwhelming judgment of students
of constitutional law,7 8 confirm that it was the Fuller Court and not the War-
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., quoting from Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), the Virginia sterilization
case, where, one might note parenthetically, the great Justice also noted that "three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough."
69. Kurland, The Supreme Court Today, 3 TRIAL, April-May 1967, at 12, 13.
70. See id. at 12, for Professor Kurland's description of Professor Paul Freund as "the
epitome of Judge Learned Hand's spirit of moderation."
71. Freund, The Supreme Court Today, 3 TRIAL, April-May 1967, at 11. See also Wright,
The Supreme Court Today, 3 TRIAL, April-May 1967, at 10.
72. See H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 62-64 (1960).
73. Vanderbilt, The New Federal Criminal Rules, 51 YALE L.J. 719, 722 (1942).
74. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 28 (1962). Even Professor Kurland, at an
earlier date, has noted that equality is one of the "fundamental objectives of our legal
structure...." Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
96 (1961).
75. For a listing and description of cases, after Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 9,
holding racial segregation invalid in numerous areas, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS-QUEsTIONS 1228 (2d ed. 1967).
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 306-08 (1880).
78. See Brief for the Committee of [almost 200] Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal
Education, reprinted as Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 289,
291-92 (1950).
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ren Court that was unfaithful to the fourteenth amendment's command of
equality.
A. Reapportionment
The 1964 Reapportionment Cases,79 holding that "as a basic constitutional
standard, the equal protection clause requires that the seats in both houses of
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,"8 0
the other of the Warren Court's grave equal protection judgments, also
merits comment. Concededly, the subject matter of these cases, unlike the
"hardships being visited on the colored race," was not the "immediate pre-
occupation" 8' of those who produced the equal protection mandate. But it
was equally apparent that the relevant constitutional language "deals not
only with racial discrimination, but also with discrimination whether or not
based on color."8 2 Thus, it was open to the Court, in the "tradition of
a broadly worded organic law . . . necessarily intended for permanence,"83 to
treat the matter of legislative apportionment within the confines of the equal
protection clause.8 4
As to the constitutional standard adopted, it must be perceived that in the
Reapportionment Cases the Court "recognized as constitutional rights...
'the democratic ideals of equality and majority rule.' ",85 The Court, cogently
fulfilling its role in a democratic society, ruled for the majority of citizens and
voters in the nation, mostly living in urban areas, whose political influence
was being seriously diluted by state legislatures dominated by minority rural
interests. On the question of the standard adopted, I believe it is adequate
here to point out, as Professor Carl A. Auerbach has thoroughly and admi-
rably demonstrated, that "no reason consistent with the democratic ideals ...
has been advanced for not effectuating" 8 the Court's "one man--one vote"
principle; that it is
79. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
80. Id. at 568.
81. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1,
60 (1955).
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id. at 59.
84. With Mr. Justice Harlan's contention that "the history of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides conclusive evidence that neither those who proposed nor those
who ratified the Amendment believed that the Equal Protection Clause limited the power
of the States to apportion their legislatures as they saw fit," supra note 79, at 595, compare
Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 33; Goldberg, Mr. Justice Harlan, The
Uses of History, and the Congressional Globe, 15 J. PUB. L. 181 (1966). See also Auerbach,
The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SuP. CT.
REv. 1, 77-78; R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRE-
SENTATION 144-45 (1965).
85. Auerbach, id. at 66.
86. Id. at 67.
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paradoxical for the advocates of judicial self-limitation to criticize
the Court for helping to make the majority rule effective, because
the case for self-restraint rests on the assumption that the Court is
reviewing the legislative acts of representatives who are put in office
and can be turned out of office by a majority of the people.8 7
But the Court also ruled in the 1964 Reapportionment Cases that a system
of legislative malapportionment is violative of equal protection even if the
product of a state initiative procedure and even if adopted "by a vote of a
majority of a State's electorate."88 Is this consistent with the Court's basic
concern under the equal protection guarantee for "democratic ideals"?
It must first be asked, what would such a "majority of a State's electorate"
consist of? Suppose that the "majority" of the state's citizens who voted to
under-represent, say, the numerically superior urban population, consisted of
a high percentage of the rural voters plus a minority of the urban voters. In
this instance, the Court's rule is persuasive: surely, the constitutional right
of the majority established by the Court should not be swept away by a com-
bined vote of (a) the rural minority and (b) a minority of the urban
majority.
But suppose that the "majority" creating the malapportionment included
a majority of those that would be under-represented by the apportionment
scheme? Of course, it is highly unlikely that the majority could be found to
have voted contrary to their seeming interest, especially when we are con-
fronted with the tremendous complexities involved in identifying which
"interest" is represented by which "majority."8 9 Perhaps this alone justifies
the Court's rule. But, although unlikely, it is conceivable. For example, a
majority of urban voters might seek to establish rural over-representation,
despite the fact that this would be generally disadvantageous to them, in the
belief that a rural-dominated legislature would be less favorably disposed to-
ward affording Negroes equal opportunity.
The Court's rule forbids this, reasoning that the "constitutional rights [of
an urban citizen who does not want rural over-representation] can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be."9 0 If the
right of an urban citizen "to cast an equally weighted vote,"91 is an individ-
ual right, in the same sense as the right of a Negro child to an education free
from state-imposed racial segregation, surely the Court's position is unassail-
able, since a plan of racially segregated education, even if enacted by a refer-
endum with the vote of a majority of both racial groups, would clearly vio-
87. Id. at 2.
88. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
89. See Auerbach, supra note 84, at 55-56; W. LOcKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra
note 75, at 1894 n.b.
90. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, supra note 88, at 736-37.
91. Id. at 736.
19671
Catholic University Law Review
late equal protection. But it is not clear that the rights are the same. The
Negro child's right may be vindicated effectively by ordering that he be as-
signed to an integrated school. The urban voter's right may only be
vindicated effectively by ordering that all urban voters "cast an equally
weighted vote." In our hypothetical, a majority of all urban voters have
elected not to cast an equally weighted vote. While it may convincingly be
said that urban citizens, challenging urban under-representation enacted
not by a referendum but by a rural-dominated legislature, "seek relief in
order to protect or vindicate an interest of their own, and of those similarly
situated,"9 2 the point is considerably more difficult if a truly free-willed refer-
endum of the kind described above has been held.
This is not to contend that the Court's rule fails. It gains support by refer-
ence to other areas of constitutional law in which effectuation of constitu-
tional rights is not hindered by the majority's willingness to waive these
rights for themselves. For example, if a referendum were to authorize a state
appropriation to construct a Methodist church building, the fact that a ma-
jority of non-Methodists had voted approval would not seem to bar an in-
junction against any state payment pursuant thereto as violative of the first
amendment's establishment clause made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment. Perhaps the constitutional right recognized by the War-
ren Court in the Reapportionment Cases is similar to the right against laws
respecting an establishment of religion.
The important point is that despite all the criticism generated by the Re-
apportionment Cases, virtually no analysis is found of this delicate, narrow
problem.9 Here, I suggest, a most useful service could be performed by those
who challenge this aspect of the work of the Warren Court.
B. Choice of Grounds for Decision
Finally, in respect to what may well be considered a wholesome use by the
Warren Court of the doctrine of equality, it should be noted that, in many
contexts, the Court's choice of the equal protection clause is effective in ful-
filling the Court's obligations, yet moderate, in that it skillfully permits a
measure of free play in the federal system. As Mr. Justice Jackson explained,
when the Court invalidates state action as being violative of equal protection,
frequently it
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the sub-
ject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact....
The framers of the Constitution knew ... that there is no more ef-
fective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable gov-
92. Baker v. Carr, supra note 10, at 207.
93. But cf. Neal, Baker v. Carr, Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 252, 271-74.
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ernment than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Con-
versely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just
than to require that laws be equal in operation. 94
Only infrequently have past Courts efficiently utilized this device. The
most noteworthy example, keenly illustrating Mr. Justice Jackson's ration-
ale, is the 1942 decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma,95 in which the Stone Court
struck down the state's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, not on the
ground that the state was without power to sterilize, but rather because the
statute's impact was too narrow, including larcenists but not embezzlers. If
Oklahoma wished to sterilize, to deny the basic right of procreation, it must
do so on a broader basis. The choice was left to the state.
The two great equal protection decisions of the Warren Court that we
have examined have not left a truly effective choice to the state. Rather, the
Segregation Cases and the Reapportionment Cases, as a practical matter,
clearly applied substantive requirements that cried out for imposition, leav-
ing little room for flexibility.96 But in confronting other sensitive issues, es-
pecially in the past several years, the Warren Court has entered the area
restrainedly through the use of the equal protection clause. Thus, in
Baxstrom v. Herold,97 the Court avoided deciding the increasingly pressing
question of whether a mental commitment must be preceded by a fair judi-
cial hearing with a jury. Rather, the Court was able to hold that New York
could not differentiate, for these purposes, between those it considered
"civilly insane" and those it considered "criminally insane." Referring to
such a hearing as a "matter affecting ... fundamental rights,"9 the Court
declined to hold that due process inflexibly requires it, but rather forced
New York to decide whether, as a political matter, it should withdraw the
opportunity for such a hearing to those who already were beneficiaries of it
under existing state legislation.99
Although this moderate equal protection approach is not without its crit-
ics who wish the Court to do more,100 its use, when appropriate, judiciously
fulfills the Court's role in the political framework. Thus, in Griffin v. I11i-
94. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (concurring
opinion).
95. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
96. See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
97. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
98. Id. at 113.
99. See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
100. See Foote, The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Cases, 10 WAYNE L. Rxv. 457, 471-72 (1964).
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nois,'0 ' the Warren Court continued to rest with the states the responsibility
for deciding whether they shall "provide appellate courts or a right to ap-
pellate review at all."'102 Nevertheless, the Court held that if a state chooses
to provide appellate review, a matter genuinely affecting "fundamental
rights," the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment"'0 3 requires
that it do not "do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted de-
fendants on account of their poverty.' 0 4
The "rise of egalitarianism"' 0 5 is conceded, but it is to be commended. In
fact, perhaps its rise may not have been extensive enough. Perhaps the de-
cision in Griswold v. Connecticut,10 6 invalidating the Connecticut anticon-
traceptive law, might better have been grounded in equal protection rather
than in the substantive "peripheries," "penumbras," and "emanations" "cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"' 0 7 or in "the lan-
guage and history of the Ninth Amendment,"' 08 or in the seemingly discred-
ited doctrine of substantive due process.'0 9 The fact appears to be that, in
Connecticut, those informed persons who could afford to consult private
physicians within or without the state had no difficulty obtaining advice
about contraception; that the law was enforced effectively only against birth
control clinics which, in the main, aided those "without either adequate
knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling."" 0
Had the Court held that the operative discrimination of the law in this
"fundamental" area of privacy, requiring "strict scrutiny,""' violated equal
protection, it could have immunized itself from Mr. Justice Black's charge of
engaging in "natural law due process philosophy.""12 Also, Connecticut
would have been faced with the choice of abandoning its "uncommonly silly
law""13 or applying it generally, rather than upon a politically weak minor-
ity-a choice, but one providing an "effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government.""' 4
Even Miranda v. Arizona"1 5 might have lent itself to the "egalitarian revo-
lution." 16 Could the Court thus have reserved the question of whether the
101. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
102. Id. at 18. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
103. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
104. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 101, at 18.
105. See text at note 66 supra.
106. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. Id. at 485.
108. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 499, 502 (Harlan and White, JJ., concurring).
110. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 504 (White, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. See text at note 94 supra.
115. Supra note 62.
116. See text at note 67 supra.
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privilege against self-incrimination extends to custodial police interroga-
tion" 7 and proceeded instead under the precept of "equal justice"?" 8 As
Judge J. Skelly Wright reports: "The representative of organized crime,
when arrested .. has his lawyer meet him at the precinct station.... The
same is true of the white collar offender-the influence peddler, the income
tax and antitrust violators." 119 Could not the Court have held that the
"equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment"' 20 requires no less for
the impecunious and unaware during his period of interrogation, "the most
critical period of his ordeal"?12' While some states undoubtedly would re-
spond by denying counsel to all at this time, some would likely provide it to
all rather than forbid it across the board, 22 thus providing a factual record of
the effect of providing counsel immediately after arrest. Would this judicial
approach not have blunted the complaint of Mr. Justice Harlan, and
many others, if the Court were later to extend the privilege against self-
incrimination, that the Court did not "have the vast advantage of empirical
data and comprehensive study"?123 Of course, without the Court's impetus,
117. See generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 64 (1966).
118. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
119. Wright, The Supreme Court Today, 3 TRIAL, April-May 1967, at 14, 16. See also,
W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 207 (1955): "[I]t is not uncommon
in some cities for a 'mouthpiece' to appear at precinct headquarters before [a "professional
criminal" or "syndicate representative"] is brought in. The undefended criminals, for the
most part, are perpetrators of amateur crime . . .or they are first or youthful offenders."
And Professor Wayne LaFave, in his recently published study of police practices in the late
1950's, noted, W. LAFAVE, ARREST 393-94 (1965):
[R]etained counsel often do enter a case shortly after arrest and immediately confer
with their clients or are present when the case reaches the district attorney's office. In
Milwaukee, they may actually sit in on the police interrogation. Indigent suspects are
not afforded counsel at these early stages.
Along the same lines, a recent New York City Bar report disclosed that
.. when an employee [of a policy game or other organized criminal activity] is appre-
hended and brought before the Judge, there appears at his side a bondsman and an
attorney, both unknown and unbidden, by the defendant at least. . . . [F]requently
collectors are back on the street taking bets again a few hours after being arrested....
Quoted in D. FREED & P. WALD, BAL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, at 35 (1964).
120. See supra note 103.
121. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 444 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See generally
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 62, at 55-61.
122. See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 69 (Howard ed. 1965):
There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable gov-
ernment then to require that the poor and the stupid and the ignorant be subjected
to police interrogation in no greater measure than the rich and the bright and the
educated; that the protections extended to the favored few be imposed generally. Con-
versely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow officials to
pick and choose only the less fortunate and the less endowed to be the subjects of secret
and persistent police interrogation and thus to escape the political retribution that
might be visited upon them if all segments of society were so affected.
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (dissenting opinion).
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I am confident that little "experimentation"' 24 would occur, because the
states, acting without the Court's prodding, have not been noted for experi-
menting by expanding the rights of the accused. Rather, the experience has
been quite the reverse.125
VI. Judicial Review in a Democracy
We turn then, finally, to a broader appraisal of the work of the Warren
Court in light of the peculiar position that the United States Supreme Court
-a group of nine men, with lifetime appointments, "hedged about by an
unusually intricate impeachment process and an absolute guaranty against
diminution of compensation"' 26-occupies in a democratic society.
A. Discussion of Theory
It is not my purpose to enter debate on the question of defining precisely
what is "democracy." But I hope that you will accept-at least as a
general, working definition-one put together recently by Professor Clif-
ton McCleskey: "[A] democratic political system is one in which public pol-
icies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective
popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle
of political equality and under conditions of political freedom."'
27
I think you will agree, as earlier noted, that, if anything, the Warren
Court's reapportionment decisions128 promote democratic values as so de-
fined. But I think you will further agree that it is not easy to classify the Su-
preme Court of the United States as established by the Constitution as
a democratic institution. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote that the Court's
124. Ibid.
125. Consider the oral argument of Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, George Mentz,
appearing as amicus curiae for Florida, in the Gideon case. As described by Anthony Lewis
in GIDEON'S TRUMPET 179-80 (1964), the following exchanges occurred:
Justice Harlan: "Supposing Betts is not overruled. How many years is it going to take
Alabama to pass a law like New York and the other states?"
Mentz: "I don't know, but there is a growing feeling in the trial courts that something
should be done."
Justice Harlan: "Supposing you had a choice-as you see it, representing the state-of
maintaining Betts on the books and then having a succession of cases come to this Court
every one of which was reversed by finding special circumstances [of prejudice, because
of the absence of counsel], so that everyone would know we were only paying lip service
to Betts, or of overruling it."
Mentz: "We would rather see them decided case by case."
Justice Harlan: "Even though you know how all of them will come out."
Mentz: "Hope springs eternal." [laughter in the courtroom.]
126. McGowan, The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System, 33 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 527, 539 (1958).
127. McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 HOUSTON L.
REv. 354, 357 (1966).
128. See text at notes 85 and 86 supra.
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powers are "inherently oligarchic"; 29 Mr. Justice Brandeis, we are told, was
not "wholly without question as to the efficacy and propriety of judicial pow-
er in a democratic system."' 3 0 If you refuse to accept the contention that the
Court is an antidemocratic institution (although, surely, carefully limited in
the exercise of power),181 then you must agree that it is at least "anti-
majoritarian,"'' 2 for even the rarely used control of constitutional amend-
ment does not satisfy the wishes of a simple majority.
It is not my position that the presence of the Court in our political scheme
makes our society undemocratic, 8 3 but with regard to the Court's exercise of
the power of judicial review, established in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison,134
it may truly be said "that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional
a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises con-
trol, not in behalf of the prevailing majority but against it";1 5 "that judicial
review is a deviant institution in the American democracy."'13 6
This, of course, is by no means to say that the Supreme Court and the doc-
trine of judicial review do not occupy a meaningful, justifiable, and desirable
status in our governmental system. It is merely to state certain premises.
Whether the power of the Supreme Court "to outlaw as unconstitutional
acts of elected officials or of officers controlled by elected officials"'137 was in-
tended by the Framers or granted by the Constitution is no longer the real
issue. Rather, as Dean Eugene V. Rostow has put it, the power of judicial
review "has been exercised by the Court from the beginning.... And it
stands now, whatever the Founding Fathers may in fact have meant, as an
integral feature of the living constitution, long since established as a working
part of the democratic political life of the nation."'3 8 "The weight of... his-
tory is evidence that the people do expect the courts to interpret, declare,
adapt and apply these constitutional provisions, as one of their main pro-
tections against the possibility of abuse by Presidents and legislatures.' 13 9
The meaningful and critical issue now is how should this power of judicial
129. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555 (1949) (concurring opinion).
130. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L.
R v. 986, 989 (1967).
131. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198
(1952).
132. See generally McCleskey, supra note 127.
133. See Rostow, supra note 131, at 199-200.
134. See text following note 37 supra.
135. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
136. Id. at 18.
137. Rostow, supra note 131, at 193.
138. Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 573, 576
(1958).
139. Id. at 590.
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review be exercised? By what standard? 40 By a Court that is "activist" or "re-
strained"? In meeting these and related issues, a justifying rationale for the
role of the Supreme Court and judicial review in a democratic society be-
comes highly relevant.
Defenders and explicators of judicial review have not been lacking. Lord
Bryce thought of the Court as "the conscience of the people, who have re-
solved to restrain themselves from hasty or unjust action by placing their
representatives under the restriction of a permanent law."' 41 Dean Rostow
feels that "[t]he discussion of problems and the declaration of broad prin-
ciples by the Courts is a vital element in the community experience through
which American policy is made. The Supreme Court is, among other things,
an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital na-
tional seminar."'1 42 Professor Bickel submits that the Court performs the task,
for which "elected institutions are ill fitted," of supporting and maintaining
"enduring general values."' 43 Professor Charles L. Black contends that "judi-
cial review is the people's institutionalized means of self-control."' 44 "[I]t can
be justified as something that fulfills popular desire.' 45
But further theory may be advanced. Granting that the Supreme Court
is a "deviant institution in the American democracy,"' 46 it must also be recog-
nized that, in an important sense, the Constitution itself is similarly anti-
majoritarian or, if you will, antidemocratic, at least in a limited fashion. Its
provisions set the boundaries of each federal department's power vis-A-vis
that of the others, of federal power vis-a-vis that of the states, of governmental
power vis-A-vis that of the individual. The Constitution commands that these
powers may not be exceeded by simple majority will; that a special
marshalling of the people's forces is required to alter the boundaries, i.e., to
amend the Constitution. Our written Constitution establishes certain "en-
during general values,' 47 ultimately subject to democratic modification, but
only if the "buffer zone" of the amending process is crossed. This "buffer
zone"-the difficult requirement of action by majorities of two-thirds and
three-fourths' 48-protects these enduring values against hasty, ill-considered,
emotion-ridden action and demands sober, deliberative, reflective consid-
eration.
The perplexing questions here are: When is the Constitution violated?
140. Cf. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
141. I. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 273 (1913).
142. Rostow, supra note 131, at 208.
143. A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 27.
144. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 107 (1960).
145. Id. at 117.
146. A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 18.
147. A. BICKEL, supra note 135, at 27.
148. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
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What body of government should decide? Marbury v. Madison assigned the
task to the Court. And again the question: by what standard should the
Court decide?
In exploring this ultimately crucial problem, it seems to me that we must
distinguish between two different types of constitutional issues. One is wheth-
er authority over the subject matter of federal action has been "delegated"
by the Constitution to the national government or whether it has been "re-
served to the States."' 49 For example, under its delegated powers, is Congress
authorized to regulate agricultural production, 150 to tax gambling, 151 to for-
bid racial discrimination by motels serving interstate travelers, 152 to prohibit
states from denying the right to vote to those who are not literate in Eng-
lish?1,3 Or are these matters beyond the federal realm and thus reserved to
the respective states? Put succinctly, do these federal actions violate "states'
rights"?
The other general issue that arises" 4 is whether a particular exercise of
governmental power, national or state, infringes individual rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution. Without exhausting the list of these individual
rights afforded constitutional protection or, in any way, attempting to de-
fine their substantive content, one need only refer, as examples, to the orig-
inal Constitution's prohibitions of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,"15
to the first eight amendments (popularly known as the Bill of Rights), to the
fourteenth amendment's guarantees of due process and equal protection.
It seems to me that if the constitutional issue is one only of states' rights,
the role of the Supreme Court, in determining whether the national govern-
ment has unconstitutionally invaded the domain of the states, should be
severely limited. The justification for judicial review in this instance, for the
final constitutional word to be spoken by a "deviant institution"" 6 in a de-
mocracy, is weak. The states, whose constitutional rights are allegedly being
assaulted, are well represented in the councils of national government (es-
pecially the Congress) and are in a peculiarly strong position to protect
themselves against national encroachment." 57 Here, the political process may
generally be depended upon to produce a fair judgment. If a majority of the
states' representatives (and I believe this is a wholly accurate description of
149. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
150. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
151. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
152. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
153. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
154. The matter of division of power among the federal departments is beyond the specific
scope of the discussion.
155. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10.
156. A. BIcitaL, supra note 135, at 18.
157. See Dowling, The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41 COLUM.
L. REv. 1160, 1173 (1941).
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members of Congress) determine that federal power has not been exceeded,
then the Court should overturn the decision, if at all, only if it is so clearly
in error as not to be "open to rational question."'' a5
But if the issue is one of alleged governmental infringement of individual
rights protected by the Constitution, it seems to me that the Court's role
should be quite different. These constitutional guarantees-such as the free-
doms of speech and religion, the constitutional rights of those accused of
crime, the right to be free from certain racial discrimination-are generally
rights of "politically impotent minorities." 159 By definition, the processes of
democracy bode poorly for the security of such rights.1 0 Rather, such rights
are frequently endangered by popular majorities.' 6 ' Thus, the task of guard-
ing these constitutionally prescribed liberties sensibly falls upon a body that
is not politically responsible, that is not beholden to the grace of excited
majoritarianism-the United States Supreme Court. Herein lies the great
justification for the power of judicial review, the wisdom of Marbury v.
Madison. In this area, the Court, if it is properly to fulfill its place in Ameri-
can democratic society, must act more forcefully' 2 -perhaps "by creating a
presumption against the validity of the contested action,"'163 perhaps "by more
158. Thayer, supra note 140, at 141. Some limited degree of judicial supervision in this
area may be justified if the confinement of federal power to that specified in the Constitution
is seen as having a purpose beyond the protection of "states' rights", i.e., if a secondary or
indirect purpose of providing that the central government be one of limited powers is the
protection of the individual against the potential abuses of an all-powerful national gov-
ernment.
159. Rostow, supra note 131, at 202.
160. Consider the remarks of former Senator Kenneth Keating, Harvard Legal Aid Bureau
Annual Banquet, Feb. 18, 1965, at 18-20:
I think it is probably fair to say the indigent persons generally, but especially those who
are alleged to be not among the law-abiding, are at the tender mercies of all the rest of
us, especially those who sit in the Halls of Congress. We are all aware of the weighty
influence wielded, for example, by the organized medical profession and the organized
bar upon legislation in Congress. It has become commonplace to speak of the "A.M.A.
Lobby" or, in the education field, the "N.E.A. Lobby." But there is no lobby of the
A.C.D.A., The American Criminal Defendant's Association....
Fortunately, there are groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
NAACP which take a strong interest in the administration of the criminal law as it
affects the disadvantaged defendant. But their voice in the legislative process is diluted
by the fact that the clientele group for which they purport to speak normally exercises
little political power, and, in fact, those in the group who have been convicted of
felony have been by law politically sterilized .... This is the key explanation of why
the recognition of the rights of indigents has been largely confined to the judicial
process. And it is one of the great ironies of American life, and always has been, that
the Congress and State legislatures will be critical of judicial law-making particularly
in the administration of criminal justice, while failing to recognize that the courts
cannot but respond firmly to social necessity when the legislative branch abdicates
responsibilities for constructive action.
161. See C. BLACK, supra note 144, at 103-04.
162. Contra, L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 66-67 (1958).
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closely scrutinizing the methods employed and the objectives to which they
lead." 64
B. The Warren Court's Role
The Warren Court has admirably fulfilled this critical role. It has coura-
geously spoken in behalf of individual rights and these decisions have pro-
duced the bulk of the attack against it. It was for the Warren Court to sustain
the promise of the equal protection clause in Brown v. Board of Education, for
"neither the Presidency nor the Congress, nor the states acted to protect the
rights of Negro citizens."' 65 Nor, unfortunately, as a realistic matter, should
we have expected political protection for the racial minority. It was for the
Warren Court to insure a fair and effective political process and "to fill a
vacuum created by the paralysis of the legislative branches of our govern-
ments"'166 in the Reapportionment Cases, for it was clear " that those elected
officials, who held their offices by reason of a rotten borough system, could
not be expected to vote for its abolition."'1 7 It was for the Warren Court to
assure the rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
in Mapp v. Ohio,16 s for it was plain that the political process was inadequate;
twelve years had passed since the states had been told that such action vio-
lated the Constitution, yet more than half of them continued to admit into
evidence the fruit of the violation.169 It was for the Warren Court to defend
the right of free speech 70 against overly broad governmental attacks on com-
munism and "disloyalty," because unlike such countries as France or Italy,
communism here is an impotent domestic political force.' 7 ' And the ex-
amples could be multiplied.
Likewise, in cases involving states' rights, the Warren Court has acted with
suitable restraint. And it has been the refusal of past Supreme Courts to do
so that has frustrated efforts to combat frightful national crises such as the
Great Depression. 72 In sustaining congressional power under the commerce
164. Ibid.
165. Wright, supra note 119, at 15.
166. Id. at 16.
167. Ibid.
168. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
169. Id. at 680 (dissenting opinion). Perhaps the best evidence of the need for an exclu-
sionary rule to assure the fourth amendment guaranty was the reaction of a number of law
enforcement officers to the rule's imposition. See Kamisar, The Tactics of Police-Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 440 (1964):
[M]any in [state] law enforcement reacted to the adoption of the exclusionary rule as
if the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure had just been written! They
talked as if and acted as if the exclusionary rule were the guaranty against unreasonable
search and seizure. What disturbed them so much was that the courts were now operat-
ing on the same premise.
170. See, e.g., Elfbrafidt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
171. See Rostow, supra note 131, at 203.
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clause to enact provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United Statesx73 and Katzenbach v. McClung,174 the Warren
Court adhered to an established tradition of granting a strong presumption
to an exercise of national control over the economy. 175 But, in sustaining con-
gressional power under the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendments to enact provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach17 6 and Katzenbach v. Morgan,'77 the Warren
Court seemingly adopted a newer theme, granting virtually unlimited power
"for a vast expansion of congressional legislation promoting human
rights."'178 And, in my view, this is as it should be. For the basic issue in-
volved under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment is the same as that under the commerce clause: whether
Congress has exceeded its powers and encroached on an area reserved to the
states. Given the political influence possessed by the states in Congress, the
constitutional issue should virtually always be resolved there.
VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of the United States need not be, nor is it, "the con-
science of the people."' 79 Nor, for that matter, need it be, nor is it, a "one-man
band,"'8 0 that department of government to cure all social and political ills
in the country. One need not approve nor agree with every judgment that
the Court has made. I certainly do not. I do believe that the strongest in-
dictment of the Warren Court is that it has zealously-perhaps, in some cases,
even overzealously-guarded the asserted constitutional rights of those whose
only effective forum for expression of those rights has been the Court itself.
For example, those disenfranchised Negroes, particularly in some parts of
the South, who could not obtain any help from legislatures where they were
not represented and those partially disenfranchised citizens in urban centers
throughout the country to whom rural dominated legislatures turned their
backs. To the charge of protecting the rights of groups such as these, a plea
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of guilty may well be advised. But for what more important function was the
Supreme Court created? Remove this avenue for protection of the constitu-
tional rights of the individual and, I suggest, the fight, inherently incapable
of being waged in the legislative halls, has only one remaining battleground.
That is the streets. The alternatives to careful judicial review are either dis-
obedience of the law (which could not be changed otherwise) or complacent
acceptance (for attempts to sear the consciences of those in power have been
notable failures). Both alternatives-violence and decadence-are intoler-
able. The Warren Court today fulfills the central justification of Marbury v.
Madison-concern for those about whom the other branches and divisions
of government often will not be concerned.
